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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are now: 
Appellant/Plaintiff: Dee Henshaw 
Appellee/defendants: Bonnie King and the Estate of Jack King 
To the best of Mr. Henshaw's knowledge, there are no other parties or entities involved 
in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE KINGS HAVE NEVER HAD STANDING TO ASSERT THAT 
RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS, THE KINGS 
SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, WHICH MILDRED WATROUS THEREAFTER 
SOLD TO BARBARA HENSHAW AND BARBARA HENSHAW THEN SOLD TO 
DEE HENSHAW, DID NOT PASS TO DEE HENSHAW, THE TRIAL COURT 
NEVER HAD JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE KINGS MOTION FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT, CLAIMING THAT RAYMOND'S INTEREST IN THE 
WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED UPON RAYMOND'S DEATH. 
THEREFORE, THE DISTRICT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND 
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DENIED 
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE ORDER 
ON MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, HOLDING THAT RAYMOND'S 
INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED UPON 
RAYMOND'S DEATH AND ULTIMATELY TO MR. HENSHAW. 
POINT I 
THE KINGS DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO ASK ANY COURT TO 
DETERMINE THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER 
RIGHTS, THE KINGS SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, DID NOT PASS TO 
MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND'S DEATH. 
Under clear and controlling Utah law, the Kings do not have standing to ask any 
court to rule that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
On page 28, f 2 of their brief, the Kings falsely claim that standing is a 
requirement only applicable to plaintiffs and not defendants. The Kings then go on to 
falsely claim that they are simply defendants in this case, and, therefore, the requirements 
of standing are not applicable to them. At best, those assertions are deliberate 
misstatements of the facts and relevant law. 
Standing is a requirement applicable to all parties who assert an original cause of 
action, whether as counter-claim plaintiffs, cross-claim plaintiffs or third party plaintiffs. 
"Anyone bringing an original proceeding—a dispute that is being presented to the courts 
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for the first time—must satisfy the traditional standing test. " Society of Professional 
Journalists. Utah Chapter v. Vullock. 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987), citing Jenkins v. Swan. 
675 P.2d at 1145 (Utah 1983). 
The Kings next falsely claim that Mr. Henshaw filed a quite title action in this 
case. (ICings Brief, page 28, ^  3). That assertion is also a deliberate misstatement of the 
facts of this case. Mr. Henshaw never filed a quite title action in this case. 
On July 14, 2000, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw filed suit 
against Jack King for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress. (Record at 1-16). Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana 
Henshaw filed an amended complaint adding Bonnie King as a defendant on August 22, 
2003. In their Amended Complaint, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw 
again asserted causes of action for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Record at 467-481). At no time did Mrs. 
Henshaw, Dee Henshaw or Dana Henshaw ever assert a cause of action for quite title 
against the Kings or anyone else. 
The Kings, however, asserted a counterclaim for quiet title in their answer to Mr. 
Henshaw's original complaint. (Record at 24-31). The Kings also filed a counterclaim 
for quiet title with their answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended Complaint. (Record at 486-
494). 
Contrary to the Kings false assertions, it is the Kings who asserted a cause of 
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action for quiet title, not Mr. Henshaw. Therefore, under the holdings of Society of 
Professional Journalists and Jenkins v. Swan, supra, the Kings, as the parties who first 
asserted a cause of action for quiet title in their counterclaims, have the obligation to 
prove they have standing to assert a claim for quiet title. The Kings have not met that 
obligation, and they cannot meet that obligation. Therefore, the Kings lack standing to 
assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
A, THE KINGS CANNOT SATISFY ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR STANDING NECESSARY TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS9 
INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS, THE KINGS SOLD TO THE 
WATROUSES. DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON 
RAYMOND'S DEATH, 
f 9 Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court may 
entertain a controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ^ 12, 154 P.3d 808. 
Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no authority to act. 
See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, *{ 
17, 148 P. 3d 960 ("Utah standing law 'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse, 
allowing in only those cases that are jit for judicial resolution.'" (quoting Terracor 
v. Utah Bd of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986))). 
Gedo v. Rose. 163 P.3d 659 (UT 2007). 
If 8 "[Tjhere are two means by which a party can establish standing—the 
traditional test and an alternative test." Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah 
Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, ^ 18, 148 P.3d960. Under the traditional test, a 
party has standing if it meets three requirements: 
First, the party must assert that it has been or will be "adversely affected by the 
[challenged] actions." Second, the party must allege a causal relationship 
"between the injury to the party, the [challenged] actions and the relief 
requested." Third, the relief requested must be "substantially likely to redress the 
injury claimed. " Id. ^19 (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Jenkins, 675 P. 2d at 1149-50). "Traditional standing criteria require that 
the interests of the parties be adverse and that the party seeking relief have a 
legally protectable interest in the controversy. "State ex rel. H.J. v. State, 1999 UT 
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App 238, \17, 986 P. 2d 115 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Hogs R US v. Town of Fairfield. 207 P.3d 1221 (Utah 2009), citing Sierra Club v. Dept. 
Of Environmental Quality. Div. Of Solid & Hazardous Waste. 857 P.2d 982 
(Utah, 1993). 
The Kings cannot satisfy any of the three requirements for standing to assert a 
claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. Therefore, they do 
not have standing to assert that Raymond' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to 
the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. 
In order for the Kings to assert they have standing to claim that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, the Kings would have to show that they would 
be directly and adversely affected if Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights 
passed to Mildred Watrous upon his death. The Kings have not made such a showing, 
and they cannot make such a showing. 
At first the Kings claimed they merely let the Watrouses use some of their water, 
however, the Kings later admitted that they sold the water rights to the Watrouses. At his 
deposition on August 23, 2004, Jack King made the following admissions under oath: 
3 Q. Okay. Then you're admitting here today, for 
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3 
5 hours full flow of Pinecreek water? 
6 A. Every 18 days. 
7 Q. Every 18 days; is that correct? 
8 A. That's right. (Page 59). 
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Because the Kings have admitted that they sold the Watrouses the water or water rights, 
rather than merely letting the Watrouses use their water, the Kings cannot now claim, and 
never could claim, that subsequent to their sale of the water rights to the Watrouses they 
retained any ownership, or other interest in the water rights, they sold to the Watrouses, 
that would be adversely affected if Raymond's interest in the water rights passed to 
Mildred. 
Because the Kings cannot show any direct interest in Raymond Watrous' 
ownership of the water rights, after they sold the water rights to the Watrouses, the Kings 
cannot show that they would be harmed or affected in any way whatsoever if Raymond's 
interest in the water rights passed to Mildred upon his death. What is indisputable is that 
no matter what happened to Raymond's interest in the water rights, it did not revert to the 
Kings, as they falsely claim in their counterclaim to quiet title to Raymond's interest in 
the water rights in themselves. After the sale of the water rights to the Watrouses, the 
Kings had no interest in the water rights that could be affected by anything the Watrouses 
did or did not do with the water rights, because at that the time of Raymond's death the 
Kings did not have "a legally protectable interest, " in the water rights, whether or not 
Raymond's interest in the water rights passed to Mildred upon Raymond's death, as 
required by the holding in Hogs R US. supra. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights did 
not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, it did not pass to the Kings, and the 
Kings have no standing, in this proceeding or any other proceeding, to claim that 
Raymond's interest in the water right did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. 
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Whether Raymond's interest in the water rights passed 100% to Mildred, 1/4 to Mildred 
and 1/8 to each of his two children, 1/6 to Mildred and 1/6 to each of his two children or 
passed to them in some other percentage, it is irrelevant in this proceeding. Whatever 
happened to Raymond's interest in the water rights, it did not pass to the Kings, and the 
Kings have no standing to assert any claim to the ownership of the water rights, because 
the Kings simply cannot show that they have or ever had "a legally protectable interest, " 
in the water rights that would be affected, whether or not Raymond's interest in the water 
rights passed to Mildred upon Raymond's death. 
If anyone had the legal right to assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights 
did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, it would be those individuals defined as 
"interestedpersons, " in UCA § 75-1-201. 
In order for the Kings to assert that they have standing to claim that Raymond's 
interest in the water rights, they sold to Watrouses, did not passed to Mildred at the time 
the Raymond's death, the Kings would have to show that they are "interestedpersons, " 
as defined in UCA § 75-1-201. The present version of UCA § 75-1-202 provides: 
"Interestedperson" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust 
estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes 
persons having priority for appointment as personal representative, other 
fiduciaries representing interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if living, or the 
settlor's legal representative, if any, if the settlor is living but incapacitated. The 
meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall 
be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any 
proceeding. 
The Kings simply cannot qualify as "interestedpersons " under the provisions of 
-6-
UCA § 75-1-202. Therefore, as a matter of law they would not have standing to assert, in 
any probate proceeding, that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. 
In the case of In Re: Estate of Peterson. 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court declared: 
'Interestedpersons" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against the estate 
of a decedent which may be affected by the proceedings. U.C.A., 1953, § 75—1— 
201(20) (1978 ed). 
When a statute creates a cause of action and designates those who may sue under 
it none except those designated may sue. Berry Properties v. City of Commerce 
City, Colo.App., 667 P.2d247 (1983). (Emphasis added). 
In this case, it is indisputable that the Kings cannot satisfy the requirements of the 
Utah Probate Code to show that they are "interestedpersons, " as mandated in the Utah 
Probate Code, in order to file a claim against the estate of Raymond Watrous. The Kings 
have not claimed, and cannot claim, that they all are "heirs, devisees, children, spouses, 
creditors, beneficiaries " of Raymond Watrous, or that they are "others having a property 
right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of1 of Raymond Watrous. Therefore, 
the Kings cannot establish, and have not established, that they have standing, or would 
have had standing, to assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights, they sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, in any probate 
proceeding. 
Because, as a matter of law, the Kings never had standing to assert that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water, they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred 
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Watrous upon Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding, they cannot establish that 
they have any right to assert in a collateral proceeding that Raymond's interest in the 
water, they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's. The Kings 
cannot obtain greater legal rights in a collateral proceeding than they would have in a 
direct probate proceeding. Therefore, the Kings have no standing to assert in this 
proceeding that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon 
Raymond's death.1 
B. THE KINGS, NOT MR. HENSHAW. HAD THE BURDEN TO PROVE 
THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS, 
THE KINGS SOLD TO THE WATROUSES. DID NOT PASS TO 
MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMONDS DEATH. 
On page 29,1f 3, the Kings make the false assertion that: 
The status of Raymond Watrous' water rights was not a 'claim' asserted by the 
Kings or even an affirmative defense, because the issue did not raise matters 
outside of Henshaw's prima facie case. 
As with most, if not all of the Kings assertions, that assertion is a deliberate 
misrepresentation of the facts and the relevant law. 
As previously established, Mr. Henshaw never filed a cause of action to quiet title 
to the water rights Mildred Watrous sold to his mother and his mother sold to him. On 
July 14, 2000, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw filed suit against Jack 
King for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction of 
1. Likewise the Kings have no standing to litigate the disposition of Raymond's 
interest in the water rights in the interest of the public at large. 
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Emotional Distress. (Record at 1-16). On August 22, 2003, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee 
Henshaw and Dana Henshaw filed an amended complaint and again asserted causes of 
action for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress. (Record at 467-481). At no time did Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw 
and Dana Henshaw ever assert a cause of action for quite title. 
The Kings, however, asserted a counterclaim for quiet title in their answer to Mr. 
Henshaw's original complaint. (Record at 24-31). The Kings also asserted a claim for 
quiet title in their answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended Complaint. (Record at 486-494). 
Therefore, and contrary to the Kings false assertions, it is they, as counterclaim plaintiffs, 
asserting causes of action for quiet title, who had the burden to establish that they had 
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to 
the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. They did not do 
so, and they cannot do so. 
Furthermore, Jack King has admitted that Mr. Henshaw in fact owns the water 
rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses. In his deposition Mr. King made the following 
statements, under oath: 
21 Q. Now, my question for you, Mr. King, is you 
22 claim in your response in paragraph No. 25 that the 
23 plaintiffs have no water right, but in paragraph 20 you 
24 — 21 you say they're using more than their fair share. 
25 If they don't have any water right, how can they have a 
1 fair share? 
2 A. Well, you—you've already established with 
3 Grace Potter that I deeded them over the three hours. 
4 Q. You deeded them over the three hours? 
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5 A. That's right 
6 Q. Okay. So they own the three hours; is that 
7 correct? 
8 A. I guess they do. (Jack King Deposition pages 9-10). 
Based on Jack King's own admission, the Kings are legally estopped to even assert that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death and ultimately to Mr. Henshaw. Therefore, Mr. Henshaw had no duty 
to prove that Raymond's interest in the water rights passed to Mildred upon Raymond's 
death, even if he had asserted a cause of action for quiet title, which he did not do. 
C. THE KINGS ASSERTION THAT THEY HAVE STANDING TO CLAIM 
THAT RAYMOND'S INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS. THE KINGS 
SOLD TO THE WATROUSES. DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED UPON 
RAYMOND'S DEATH BECAUSE THEY HAVE A PERSONAL STAKE IN 
THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE IS YET ANOTHER DELIBERATE 
MISREPRESENTATION OF THE FACTS AND THE RELEVANT LAW. 
The Kings assertion that they have standing to claim that Raymond's interest in the 
water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death, is another deliberate misrepresentation of the facts and relevant law. 
In district court, standing is not determined by the amount of damages sought by a 
plaintiff. The fact that a defendant is subject to personal liability in a lawsuit does not 
confer standing on the defendant to assert claims on behalf of third parties or causes of 
actions, that if they exist at all, belong to third parties. 
The Kings do not have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the 
water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death, simply because they are subject to some personal liability in this case. 
In order for the Kings to have standing to assert that Raymond's interest in the water 
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lights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, 
the Kings would have to "show some distinct and palpable injury" that they suffered at 
the time Raymond Watrous died, if his interest in the water rights passed to Mildred. The 
Kings have not done that, and they cannot do that. Whether or not the Kings may be 
exposed to personal liability and damages in this case is irrelevant. 
The Kings cannot base their standing on any liability and/or damages they may be 
subject to in this case. The Kings can only claim standing to assert that the water rights, 
the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond 
Watrous5 death, if they can prove "show some distinct and palpable injury" that they 
suffered at the time Raymond died, or would have suffered, at the time of Raymond's 
death, if his interest in the water rights passed to Mildred. They cannot do that. 
Therefore, they do not now have, and never did have, standing to assert that Raymond's 
interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon 
Raymond's death.2 
POINT II 
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE IS NOT TIME BARRED. 
Because the trial court never had jurisdiction to hear or rule on the Kings' claim 
that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did 
not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate is not time 
barred. Therefore, as a matter of law, that portion of the trial court's Order on Motions 
2. The Kings also have not shown, and cannot show, any significant public interest in 
the ownership of the water rights, that would give them standing to litigate the disposition 
of Raymond's interest in the water rights in the interest of the public at large. 
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for Directed Verdict, holding that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold 
to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, is void, and a void 
judgment can be challenged at any time in any proceeding. See Authority of the City of 
Salt Lake v. Snyder Housing. 67 P.3d 1055 (Utah 2002). 
In Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
declared: 
[TJhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void The one-year [three-
month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is expressly 
inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made within a 
Ir
reasonable time," which seems literally to apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4), 
cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. A void judgment cannot 
acquire validity because of laches on the part of the judgment debtor. 
Because, the Kings never had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in 
the water rights, the Kings sold to Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death, the trial court never had jurisdiction to even consider or rule on the 
Kings' assertion that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings admit they sold to 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. 
Standing is jurisdictional, and a party cannot litigate the claims of another party. 
See Gedo v. Rose: supra, holding: 
Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no authority to act. 
See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, 
^17, 148 P. 3d 960 ("Utah standing law 'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse, 
allowing in only those cases that are fit for judicial resolution.'" (quoting Terracor 
v. Utah Bd of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986))). 
(Emphasis added). 
Furthermore, standing is an issue that is never waived and can be raised at any time. See. 
Inre: Estate of Hunt 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992), wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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Standing, of course, is an issue that is never waived and can be raised by any 
party or by the court at any time. See Terracor, 716 P. 2d at 798; Stromquist, 646 
P.2dat 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Blodgett v. 
lions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P. 2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Because standing is jurisdictional, because standing can be raised at any time and 
is never waived, because without standing a court has no jurisdiction to act, and because 
the Kings cannot satisfy the requirements for standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' 
interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, that portion of the trial court's order on Motion 
for Directed Verdict holding that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to 
the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death is void, as a 
matter of law, because the trial court never had jurisdiction to even hear, much less, rule 
on the Kings assertion that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death. Because an order 
entered by a court without jurisdiction to enter the order is void as a matter of law, Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate is timely, because as the Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Garcia v. Garcia, supra: 
[TJhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The one-year [three-
month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is expressly 
inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made within a 
"reasonable time, " which seems literally to apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4), 
cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. A void judgment cannot 
acquire validity because of laches on the part of the judgment debtor. (Emphasis 
added). 
Because that portion of the trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict, 
holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
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Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, is void for lack of 
jurisdiction, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate was timely, and the trial court committed 
reversible and prejudicial error when it denied it.3 
POINT III 
THAT PORTION OF THE ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
HOLDING THAT RAYMOND WATROUS9 INTEREST IN THE WATER 
RIGHTS, THE KINGS SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, DID NOT PASS TO 
MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND'S DEATH IS VOID AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, NOT MERELY VOIDABLE. 
The Kings falsely assert that the part of trial court's Order on Motions for Directed 
Verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death is merely voidable, rather than 
void. The assertion is a misrepresentation of the facts of this case and the relevant and 
controlling law. 
As established in Point I and Point II, of this Brief, that part of the trial court's 
Order on Motions for Directed Verdict, holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the 
water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's 
death is void because the Kings do not have standing to assert that Raymond's interest in 
the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon 
Raymond's death. 
3. The defendant's citations to various federal and state cases discussing what is a 
reasonable time to file a Rule 60(b) motion, under the FRCP, are not only irrelevant, they 
are deliberately misleading. In none of the cases cited by the Kings was there an issue of 
the basic subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. None of those cases are controlling 
or even relevant to the facts of this case. 
-14-
Because standing is jurisdictional, Gedo v. Rose, supra, the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to hear or rule upon the Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the 
water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death. 
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to even hear or rule upon the Kings 
claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Waatrous upon Raymond's death, that portion of the 
trial court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is void as a matter of law. 
If a court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment or order issued by that court is void as a 
matter of law. 
"[A] judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or because some 
irregularity inhered in its rendition. It is void only if the court that rendered it 
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties or if the court acted in a 
manner inconsistent with due process."Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey, 221 Kan. 
17, 558 P.2d 101, 104 (1976) (emphasis added) 
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. Inc.. 817 P.2d 382 (Ut App. 1991). 
*f 10 Although Melvin does not present it as such, the challenge to personal 
jurisdiction in the context of an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is 
properly brought under Rule 60(b)(4), which permits the trial court to relieve a 
party from a void judgment See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); see also Richins v. 
Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (stating 
judgment '"is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the 
subject matter or of the parties' ") (citation omitted). 
Franklin Convey Client Sales. Inc. v. Melvin. 2 P.3d 451 (Ut. App. 2000). 
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to even hear or rule upon the Kings 
claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, under clear and 
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controlling Utah law, that portion of the trial court's Order on Motions for Directed 
Verdict is void as a matter of law, not merely voidable, as the Kings falsely assert. 
POINT IV 
MR. HENSHAW'S APPEAL IS NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF "THE 
LAW OF THE CASE.'5 
Contrary to the Kings assertion, Mr. Henshaw's appeal is not barred by the 
doctrine of "The Law of the Case." 
The Kings assert in Point III of their brief that Mr. Henshaw's appeal is barred by 
the Doctrine of "The Law of the Case." However, the Kings also admit this Court has 
never ruled on Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear or 
consider the Kings' assertion that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the 
Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
(Kings' brief page 24, ^  2). Therefore, the doctrine of "The Law of the Case," cannot 
possibly apply to Mr. Henshaw's appeal, because this Court has not made any ruling with 
respect to Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the Kings' do not have standing to claim that 
Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to 
Mildred upon Raymond's death, that became "The Law of the Case." 
Nothing trumps jurisdiction! The doctrine of "Law of the Case" cannot trump 
jurisdiction. As previously established in this Brief, because the Kings do not have 
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to 
the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, the district court 
never had jurisdiction to even consider or rule on the Kings assertion that Raymond's 
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interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon 
Raymond's death. Because the trial court never had jurisdiction to even consider or rule 
on the Kings assertion that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, the doctrine of "The Law of 
the Case" is inapplicable in this matter, whether under The Mandate Rule, The Prior 
Ruling Rule or The Final Decision Rule.4 
POINT V 
THE KINGS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The Kings assert that they are entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this case, 
because, as the Kings claim, Mr. Henshaw's appeal is frivolous. In support of this claim, 
the Kings make two assertions; 1) there is no evidence that Raymond Watrous died, and 
2) the jury did not find that the Kings sold the water rights to the Watrouses and those 
water rights were ultimately transferred to Mr. Henshaw. 
The Kings assertion that there is no evidence that Raymond Watrous died is 
laughable at best. The Kings entire case is based on the fact that Raymond's interest in 
the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death. They cannot now claim that Raymond did not die. The Kings have 
stipulated that he is dead by filing two counterclaims seeking to quiet title to his portion 
of the water rights that they admit they sold to the Watrouses. The Kings specifically 
4. Because none of the cases cited by the Kings in their brief involved the basic 
jurisdiction of the court, they are inapplicable to the facts of this case, and their holdings 
are totally irrelevant. 
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claim in their counterclaims that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to 
Mildred upon Raymond's death. Are the Kings asserting that Raymond's interest in the 
water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death, but that he is not dead4? That 
assertion is beyond laughable! 
The Kings claim that the jury did not rule that the water rights, the Kings sold to 
the Watrouses, passed to Mr. Henshaw. While it is true that the jury verdict form did not 
seek a determination that the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not 
ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw, it was undisputed that the Kings sold a certain amount 
of water and/or water rights to the Watrouses. It was also undisputed that Mildred 
Watrous sold all of the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses to Barbara Henshaw 
and that Barbara Henshaw sold all of the water rights she bought from Mrs. Watrous to 
Dee Henshaw. 
The jury was unaware that Judge Lee had granted the Kings' motion for a directed 
verdict and ruled that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights had not passed to 
Mildred Watrous upon his death and, therefore, did not pass to Mr. Henshaw. Therefore, 
when the jury determined that the Kings were not entitled to have the water rights quieted 
in them, the jury was in fact ruling that Mr. Henshaw owned all of the water and/or water 
rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, because the Kings had admitted they sold the 
water and/or water rights to the Watrouses, and it was undisputed that Mildred Watrous 
sold all of the water and/or water rights to Barbara Henshaw and that Barbara Henshaw 
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sold all of the water and/or these water rights to Dee Henshaw.5 
Mr. Henshaw5s appeal is based on indisputable facts and clear and controlling 
Utah Law, unlike the Kings assertions that are based on deliberate misrepresentations of 
both fact and law. Even if this Court should affirm the district court's decision, Mr. 
Henshaw5 s appeal of the decision is not frivolous or in bad faith. Therefore, even if this 
Court affirms the district court's decision, the Kings are not still not entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees. 
POINT VI 
MR. HENSHAW IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
THIS CASE BECAUSE THE KINGS' OPPOSITION TO HIS APPEAL IS 
SPURIOUS, DISINGENUOUS, AND IS FILED IN BAD FAITH, AT BEST. 
Throughout their brief, the Kings deliberately make false assertions of fact and 
false representations of the law. Their opposition to Mr. Henshaw's Appeal is spurious, 
disingenuous, at best, and is filed in bad faith. 
In their brief, the Kings make the following false assertions of fact, among others: 
1) Mr. Henshaw filed a quiet title action; (King brief, page 2, U 3); 2) the Kings are 
simply defendants in this action; (King brief, page 30, ^  2); 3) the Kings quiet title causes 
of action are simply responses to Mr. Henshaw's Complaints; (King brief, page 28, f^ 2); 
4) at the close of Mr. Henshaw's case the district court allowed Mr. Henshaw to assert a 
quiet title action; (King brief, page 5, paragraph numbered 3); 5) the district court 
5. Although the jury did determine that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled to use the water, 
it did so because he failed to file an application for a change of diversion with the Utah 
Department of Water Resources, as he was required to do before he used the water. 
However, his failure to file an application for a change of diversion with the Utah 
Department of Water Resources did not affect his ownership of the water. 
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implicitly ruled that the Kings have standing; (King brief, page 15, ^  3); 6) as the 
plaintiff in a quiet title action, Mr. Henshaw had the burden of proving that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, passed to Mildred 
Watrous upon Raymond's death, (King brief, page 28, ^ f 3); 7) The status of Raymond 
Watrous' water rights was not a "claim" asserted by the Kings or even as an affirmative 
defense, (King brief, page 29, *f 3); 8) whether defendants had standing or not, Mr. 
Henshaw was required to prove that he had title to the water rights, (King brief, page 29, 
U 4); 9) it was the Henshaws that sued the Kings, not the other way around, (King brief, 
page 30, Tf 1); and 10) that Raymond Watrous died is not a fact. (King brief, page 34-35, 
14-1). 
The Kings also made the following misrepresentations of law, among others: 1) a 
judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction is subject to the time provisions of Rule 
60(b)(4) URCP, (King brief, page 14, f 2); 2) even if the Kings lack standing, the trial 
court's order on the King's motion for a directed verdict is not void, (King brief, page 16-
17, Tfs 3-1); 3) "The Doctrine of the Law of Case" applies to void judgments, (King brief, 
page 30, Tf 1), 4) standing is applicable only to plaintiffs, (King brief, page 28, ^  2); 5) the 
status of Raymond Watrous' water rights did not raise matters outside Mr. Henshaw's 
causes of action for Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress, (King brief, page 29, ^ f 3), 
As previously established in this Brief, the Kings simply do not have standing, and 
never had standing, to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the 
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Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
Neither the Kings nor the district court has ever been able to explain how the Kings have 
standing to assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon 
Raymond's death. 
Also, as previously established in this brief, whatever happened to Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water rights, it did not pass to the Kings, and the Kings do not 
now have, and never had, any legal right to the water rights, once they sold them to the 
Watrouses. Therefore, as a matter of law, they have no standing to claim that the water 
rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
The jury at the trial of this matter ruled that the water rights did not pass to the 
ICings, and the Kings did not appeal that decision. Therefore, they are now estopped to 
assert that they have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights 
did not pass to Mildred Watrous, because the jury ruled at the trial of this matter that the 
Kings have no interest in the water rights. Ergo, the Kings opposition to Mr. Henshaw's 
appeal is spurious, disingenuous, in bad faith and a per se violation of Rule 40 URAP. 
The Kings bad faith in opposing Mr. Henshaw's appeal is not only demonstrated 
by their deliberate misstatements of fact and misrepresentations of the relevant law, but 
also by their failure to even attempt to address and/or distinguish the holdings of Society 
of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter vr Vullock: Gedo v. Rose: In Re: Estate of 
Peterson: Garcia v. Garcia: Richins v Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. Inc.: and Franklin 
Convey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin as they apply to this case. Because the Kings have 
deliberately misrepresented the facts of this case and misstated the relevant law, their 
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opposition to Mr. Henshaw's appeal is in bad faith and a per se violation of Rule 40 
URAP. Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 40 URAP and Rule 33 URAP, 
Mr. Henshaw should be awarded his costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this 
appeal and in defending the Kings' spurious, disingenuous action to quiet title to 
Raymond's interest in the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
When the facts are understood, and the relevant controlling law is applied to those 
facts, it is indisputable that the Kings never had standing to assert that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, and, therefore, the district court never had 
jurisdiction to hear or rule on the Kings' causes of action seeking to quite title to 
Raymond's interest in the water rights in themselves. Because the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to even to hear or rule on the Kings' causes of action seeking to quite title to 
Raymond's interest in the water rights in themselves, as a matter of law, that portion of 
the district court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict is void. Therefore, Mr:-
Henshaw respectfully requests that this court reverse that portion Order on Motions for 
Directed Verdict holding that Raymond's interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to 
die Watrouses did not pass to Mildred upon his death. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of August 200& ^ 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
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